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Justice was attempting to avoid the problems that the Court would
face when desperate lawyers would seize on this "unenforceable" but
"valid" covenant to find a way to enforce it themselves, or else to put
it into an enforceable form.
This is not a new problem, nor did it go unnoticed after Shelley v.
Kraemer created it. A number of Law Journal writers expressed
sentiments similar to the following, which was written just prior to
Barrows v. Jackson:
Does the Supreme Court really incline toward the position that the
restrictive covenants when enforced are the violations of the equal
protections clause or are they invalid per se? It is probable that these
decisions will give rise to actions for damages for breach of covenant.
If so, the above question must of necessity be decided, for then the
cause of action will not involve issues of equal protection of the laws
or discrimination, but will present squarely to the Court the question
of the inherent validity of the covenant itself.n
The writer predicts that the Supreme Court will be faced with
this question again, and in such a manner that it will have to decide
unequivocally that such covenants, restrictions, terms, limitations or
conditions, in any manner worded, or to be enforced are void. Other-
vise, innumerable attempts in various shapes, shades, and sizes will
forever be before the courts as property owners contrive other means
to "restrict Negroes to their overcrowded Harlems."5 2
ROGER B. LELAND
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT
In Kentucky and other states which follow the federal rule that
evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement officers is not admis-
sible, the laws surrounding search and seizure become an important
factor in the administration of the criminal law. In these jurisdictions,
when the evidence has been obtained by searching the accused or his
effects, the defense counsel should not overlook the possibility of ob-
jecting to its admissibility on the ground that the seizure of the evi-
but the judicial enforcement of them against Negro vendees. The question which
we decided was simply whether a state court could decree the ouster of Negroes
from property which they had purchased and which they were enjoying. We
held that it could not. We held that such judicial action, which operated directly
against the Negro petitioners and deprived them of their right to enjoy their
property solely because of their race, was state action and constituted a denial of
equal protection .... This case is different." Id. at 261.
' Note, 33 CoRN. L. Q. 293 at 294 (1947).
"'Note, 13 ALB.ANY L. 11Ev. 92, 96 (1949).
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dence was illegal. On the other hand, prosecutors and peace officers
also should be familiar with the technicalities of a legal search and
seizure to prevent the freeing of an obviously guilty defendant due to
an ignorance of the proper procedure in gathering evidence. One
perplexing phase of this branch of the criminal law involves the search-
ing of automobiles without search warrants. Such searches may be
divided into two categories: (1) Where the search is incidental to the
arrest, and (2) where the officer searches the automobile upon a
reasonable belief of the commission of a felony therein. It is in this
order that these categories will be discussed.
First, however, it is advisable to look at the constitutional provision
governing the problem. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States provides: ".... the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches, and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but on probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." The Kentucky Constitution has a similar provision.' It
is to be noted that the constitutional provision does not denounce all
searches but only "unreasonable searches." It is upon an interpretation
of this phrase that the courts have allowed the searching of automobiles
without warrants. In arriving at the conclusion that the search of
automobiles under certain circumstances is not unreasonable, the courts
have taken into consideration the fact that since vehicles are easily
moved out of the jurisdiction it would be impractical to seek out a
magistrate and obtain a warrant due to the time element in such
cases.2 Language of this import is found in United States v. Cotter.3
"The search here was not of a dwelling house but of an automobile, a
means of rapid transportation. As to vehicles, a search warrant is not
required under the Fourth Amendment because of the impracticability
of its timely procurement, as against a readily movable conveyance,
renders a search warrant an unavailing and therefore unnecessary
process." (Italics writer's) A distinction also has been drawn between
an automobile and other property in that an automobile is merely a
means of transportation for use on the public highways and is not
actively used on private premises, which the law guards with more a
zeal from search and seizure without process. 4 In the main, the auto-
mobile cases represent a practical adjustment to the problem of the
mobility of automobiles; fundamentally, the courts cling to the theory
1 Ky. CONST. See. 10.
'Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1924).
'80 F. Supp. 590, 592 (E. D. Va. 1948).4 People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289 (1922).
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that where the securing of a search warrant is practical it must be
obtained.5
In the first category-where the search is incidental to an arrest-
no great problem is presented, as it is a fundamental principle that
when one is arrested, his person and the immediate vicinity, including
the articles under his control, may be searched without a warrant."
With the advent of the automobile, it was decided that the search of a
car in which the arrested person was riding was incidental to the ar-
rest.7 This rule is qualified by the requirement that the arrest must be
a lawful one; if the arrest is unlawful, the search is also unlawful.8 It
should be emphasized that the search, by the very terminology of the
rule, must be "incidental" to the arrest.
The majority of the courts makes no distinction as to whether the
arrest is for a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, a traffic
violation is enough to justify a search in conjunction with the arrest.9
However, in the writer's opinion, this type of random search is not
within the original purpose of allowing a search incidental to the arrest.
The original justification for the rule was two-fold. First, the search
was necessary to prevent the person arrested from escaping or doing
injury to the officers or himself with some weapon to which he might
have access. Second, the search was necessary to disclose evidence of
the crime or implements used to effect the crime for which the arrest
was made. In showing the lack of these justifications in a traffic case,
it is necessary to consider a typical traffic violation. For example, in a
reckless driving case, if the officer is at all suspicious of the occupants
of the automobile, he will thoroughly search it in connection with the
arrest; this will include not only the easily accessible part of the auto-
mobile but also the locked trunk and glove compartments. The ques-
tion then arises: Is the search of the locked trunk and glove compart-
ments lawful? To this the answer would seem to be, "no." However,
such searches are common practice and at least one case supports the
conclusion that they are lawful. 10
5Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Morrisofi v. State, 192 Tenn. 48 237
S.W. 2d 548 (1951); 47 Am. Jun. 514 (1943).
'U. S. v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950); Agnello v. U. S., 269 U. S. 20(1925).
7Billings v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 381, 3 S. IV. 2d 770 (1928); People v.
Overton, 293 Mich. 44, 291 N. W. 216 (1940); Melton v. State, 110 Tex. Cr. 439,
10 S. W. 2d 384 (1927).8 State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W. 789 (1923); Hughes v. State, 145
Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588 (1922).
' Marsh v. U. S., 29 F. 2d 172 (2nd Cir. 1928); Dafoff v. State, 198 Ind. 234,
153 N. E. 398 (1926); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 123, 41 S. W. 2d 913
(1931); King v. State, 73 Oki. Cr. 404, 121 P. 2d 1017 (1942).
" People v. Barg, 384 Ill. 172, 51 N. E. 2d 168 (1943). The courts also
seem to support that conclusion by the terminology used in their opinions in the
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However, on what basis can such a search be justified on the prin-
ciples set forth? Admittedly, there is a possibility that the arrestee
could obtain a weapon from a locked glove compartment, but this is
very remote since usually he does not have access to the keys after the
arrest and even though he had another set of keys it would be improb-
able that he would be able to open the compartment with the officers
standing near the car, or by him. And there would be even less likeli-
hood that he could obtain a weapon from the trunk, at least not enough
probability to justify the search on that basis. In disposing of the
second justification in such cases-that the search was necessary to dis-
close evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made-it is suf-
fiicient to ask: What evidence is there to be disclosed in one of the
compartments of the car which would be of value in a reckless driving
or speeding violation? The writer knows of no evidence in such a case
that could be concealed in these parts of the vehicle.
Probably the courts' reasoning for allowing the seizure of evidence
of a different crime than that for which the arrest is made (which is
what generally happens in a search and seizure in connection with a
traffic offense, since the evidence usually found consists of intoxicating
liquor or stolen property) is based upon the type of rationalization
found in the case of Harris v. United States." In that case the Supreme
Court of the United States held that in connection with an arrest for
forgery the search could extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises under his immediate control, which under the
circumstances extended the search to all five rooms of the arrestee's
apartment. During this extensive search, draft cards, the possession
of which was unlawful, were seized although unconnected with the
crime for which the defendant was arrested. The reasons for allowing
such an all inclusive search seem to rest on the fact that since Harris
was in exclusive possession of all of the rooms, his control naturally
extended to such rooms, and in such rooms fruits of the crime and other
evidence pertaining to the crime could be concealed. As mentioned
before, however, such reasoning does not apply to the automobile in
a traffic violation case because the vehicle, although in the arrestee's
possession, could not conceivably conceal any evidence of the crime;
therefore, the search which discloses the illegally possessed articles
should be illegal since there is no reasonable basis for it. It is sub-
mitted that the type of reasoning in the Harris case, when applied to a
traffic violation cases. In most of these cases no reference is made to the various
parts of the automobile but only to the automobile itself in upholding the legality
of the search. Apparently the place in the automobile where the contraband is
found is immaterial. Therefore, it can be reasonably inferred that the whole
automobile or any part of it may be searched.
3881 U. S. 145 (1947).
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situation involving a search of a locked glove compartment or the
trunk of an automobile as incidental to a lawful arrest of the driver
for a traffic violation, gives rise to too many instances where the
search and not the arrest is the object of the arrest. While the re-
quirement that the arrest be in good faith prohibits making the search
the real object,'2 there is little evidence other than that offered by the
officer concerning the good faith of the arrest. To cite an example, it is
the custom for officers who suspect that a car is transporting contra-
band to follow it until a traffic violation occurs. The driver is then
arrested and the car searched under the guise of its being incidental
to the arrest. In such a situation, the likelihood of showing bad faith
on the officer's part is practically nil, and yet the citizen's car has been
searched without a warrant, on mere suspicion, which, as will be dis-
cussed in connection with the next category, is clearly an unreasonable
search. It is submitted that this is wrong and definitely contravenes the
original purpose which the framers of the Constitution had in mind
in prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.
The next category to be discussed is the one where the search is
based upon a reasonable belief that a felony is being committed in the
automobile. This is the basis for the search. In these situations, the
actual language of the courts has brought into usage the rule of "prob-
able cause." The basis for this rule, as previously discussed, rests upon
the factor of mobility of the motor vehicle which renders it impractical
to obtain a search warrant. 'Probable cause" is a rather elusive phrase
and raises a judicial question which is dependent on the facts of the
particular case;13 however, a definition inaugurated by Chief Justice
Taft in the case of Carroll v. United States14 is probably the one most
alluded to by the courts. In that case, the Chief Justice stated that
"probable cause" exists, "upon a belief, reasonably arising out of the
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and desfruc-
tion .... 15 The Supreme Court decided there that "probable cause"
did exist where the automobile, which was coming from a known
source of liquor supply, was stopped on a highway and searched
without a warrant by prohibition agents, who knew the persons within
the automobile to be bootleggers and knew that the automobile was
the same one used in an attempt to sell the officers whiskey a short
time before the search. The fact that the whiskey was so concealed as
' McKnight v. U. S., 183 F. 2d 977 (D. C. Cir. 1950); Henderson v. U. S.,
12 F. 2d 528 (4th Cir. 1926).
"Padgett v. State, 90 Old. Cr. 269, 213 P. 2d 580 (1950).
11267 U. S. 132 (1925).
1Id. at 149.
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not to be evident to their senses did not invalidate the search. Although
this decision, in applying the definition, has been severely criticized,10
it is a landmark case in the field and has had no small effect upon the
state courts in defining "probable cause" and interpreting it. A later
Supreme Court case, Husty v. United States 7 set forth basically the
same definition as the Carroll case; however, it clarified the problem
slightly by stating that it is not necessary that the arresting officer
should have before him legal evidence of the suspected illegal act,
if there is reasonable belief of its existence. Most courts have con-
cluded that "probable cause" exists where it has been induced by the
senses' 8 or by reliable information."0 In commenting on information
received as a basis for probable cause, Cornelius in his work on search
and seizure states that where the information given the officer was
given anonymously, that in itself will not constitute probable cause
for stopping and searching the automobile, while, if the information
was furnished by a reliable person, it will.20 In all cases, it is necessary
that the probable cause be evident before the search, and the officer
does not justify the illegal search by finding articles or contraband sub-
ject to seizure in the vehicle on a search of it without probable cause.21
In all events, regardless of the amount of probable cause involved,
either before or after the search, such probable cause will not justify
the search of the person within the automobile 22 unless, of course, he
has been arrested. It is to be noted that all the points discussed above
in relation to probable cause involve automobiles on the highways or
places to which the public has access. When the vehicle is upon
private property, generally such searches are under the high protection
accorded such premises.23 Thus a search of an automobile on private
premises without a warrant for the search of the premises is a violation
of the constitutional guaranty.
24
In Kentucky, the rule as to "probable cause" is basically the same
as in other jurisdictions. A 1948 decision25 held that an automobile may
not be stopped on the highway and searched without a warrant unless
I° Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 CoL. L. REv. 1068 (1929).
1 282 U. S. 694 (1931).
2SFerrell v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548, 264 S. W. 1078 (1924); State v.
Loftis, 316 Mo. 878, 292 S. W. 29 (1927); 79 C. J. S. 850-851 (1952).
"Cannon v. U. S., 158 F. 2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946); Medina v. U. S. 158 F. 2d
955 (5th Cir. 1946).
Coswurus, SEArcH AND SEizuRE 223 (2nd ed. 1930).
' Elardo v. State, 164 Miss. 628, 145 So. 615 (1933); Graves v. State, 1 Tex.
Cr. 26, 20 S. W. 2d 769 (1929); Weaver v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 529, 59 S. W. 2d
396 (1933).
'See, U. S. v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948).
56 C. J. 1197 (1932).
' U. S. v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963, 975 (S. D. Ga. 1923); U. S. v. Slusser, 270
Fed. 818, (S. D. Ohio 1921).
Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 307 Ky. 630, 211 S. W. 2d 841 (1948).
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a misdemeanor is being committed in the presence of the officer or he
has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed. In
defining the phrase, it is stated:
[Pirobable cause is synonymous with reasonable cause. It means a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
grounds exist for the search, or that the person sought has committed
a felony, or such a state of facts as would lead a man to believe, or
to entertain a strong suspicion, that property is possessed subject to
forfeiture or that a person has committed a felony. Probable cause
does not mean prima facie evidence of guilt.26
Kentucky is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions in holding
that a search based upon mere suspicion is illegal.27 However, where
an automobile is stopped and searched on mere suspicion but such
search is consented to by the occupant, the consent makes the pro-
cedure a legal one.28
Since the problem of probable cause is solved in each case by
applying the definition of the phrase to the particular circumstances
and facts of that case, a practical approach to the question of what
constitutes probable cause is to examine particular holdings on the
subject. The following represenf typical holdings. In a 1928 Mis-
sissippi case,20 the automobile was being driven at a late hour and
the occupants were boisterous. It was held that no probable cause
existed. In United States v. Shelton et al.,0 probable cause did exist
where an accoupant of the automobile was a flagrant violator and there
were the additional facts that the officers had information that he was
using the automobile to transport whiskey and it was apparent that
the automobile was heavily loaded. Probable cause was again present
in a Kentucky case,31 where the officer saw several kegs in the rear
seat and smelled whiskey. An interesting case often cited is United
States v. Cotter.32 There the officers undertook to follow the defend-
ants automobile because he had the reputation of being a bootlegger.
The court held that the liquor found was not admissible in the federal
prosecution because the mere fact that the accused was a known boot-
legger did not amount to probable cause. In other cases, the fact that
the accussed was a reputed bootlegger plus other facts has met the
'U. S. v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W. D. Ky. 1937).
- Marsh v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 484, 74 S. W. 2d 943 (1934).
'Campbell v. U. S., 151 F. 2d 605 (6th Cir. 1945); French v. Common-
wealth 211 Ky. 288, 277 S. W. 265 (1925); People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616,
217 N. W. 797 (1928).
' Sellers v. Lofton, 149 Miss. 849, 116 So. 104 (1928).
'59 F. Supp. 273 (E. D. Ky. 1945).
Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 548, 264 S. NV. 1078 (1924).
"Supra, note 3.
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probable cause requirements. Such a case is United States v. Gilliam.33
The sheriff told federal officers that he had reliable information that the
accused was going in his automobile to get moonshine at a reputed
moonshiner's hideout. This, coupled with the fact that the officers
saw him leave the hideout, gave them probable cause. It is interesting
to compare this case with one where the information was received by
an anonymous phone call. This, together with the fact that the auto-
mobile was heavily laden, did not amount to probable cause.34 Natu-
rally, there is no limit to the situations which may arise involving the
element of probable cause, but it is hoped that the examples cited,
which have been passed upon by the courts, will aid the reader better
to understand what constitutes probable cause.
Conclusion and comments
Under certain circumstances, the search of an automobile without a
search warrant is not unreasonable within the meaning of the con-
stitutional guaranty which prohibits "unreasonable searches." These
circumstances occur in two situations: (1) Where the search is in-
cidental to a valid arrest; (2) Where the search is based upon a reason-
able belief that a felony is being committed within the vehicle.
In the first situation, it is sufficient if the arrest is made for a mis-
demeanor as well as a felony. An arrest for a traffic violation will in
fact justify a search of the vehicle. In the writer's opinion, the search-
ing of the easily accessible parts of an automobile in connection with
an arrest for a traffic violation is permitted by one of the justifications
for the rule, but that the searching of the not so easily accessible parts,
such as the locked glove compartment and the trunk, should not be
permitted, although the courts apparently make no distinction as to
what parts of the vehicle may be searched. In allowing a search of the
entire automobile, the broad existing rule has given rise to a situation
where an arrest for a traffic violation is often made for the sole pur-
pose of searching the automobile, which in effect deprives the citizen
of His fundamental right to be protected from an unreasonable search.
In commenting on the second category into which such cases fall-
where the search is based upon a reasonable belief of guilt-it is sub-
mitted that the existing law is reasonable. It is believed that funda-
mentally the rule is related to the more well-known proposition that an
officer can arrest upon a reasonable belief; if he can make an arrest
under such circumstances a fortiori he may search to see if his reason-
able belief is true. It must be admitted too that the rule is one of good
"87 F. Supp. 808 (E. D. Tenn. 1950).
"U. S. v. Allen 16 F. 2d 320 (E. D. Fla. 1926).
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social policy since (1) it gives police officers a much needed power
in combating the increasing use of automobiles in the perpetration of
crime, and (2) it permits officers to search a person's car, without
subjecting him to the humiliation of being arrested, if the search dis-
closes that no crime has been committed. The writer's main criticism
of the rule is its lack of notoriety and use among those who enforce
the law, especially on the state and local levels. Many officers, in fact,
do not know that a search may be made on reasonable belief; they con-
sider that one may only be made in connection with a lawful arrest-
the situation found in the first category in this discussion. Such officers
are limited to. one-half of the grounds for lawful searches and seizures
because of their lack of knowledge of the full possibilities of the law.
GARDNEa L. TuRNER
HOMICIDE-THE KENTUCKY NEGLIGENT
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
In the recent case of Long v. Commonwealth1 the Kentucky Court
of Appeals again had before it for consideration the Kentucky negli-
gent voluntary manslaughter doctrine. In this case the defendant was
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and appealed, urging: (1) that
the verdict was not sustained by the evidence, and (2) that the in-
structions were erroneous. It appeared that on the evening before
the killing the deceased Collins, one Perdue, and defendant Long
had a drinking party at the home of Perdue. Collins was killed the
next morning by a shot at close range. Defendant Long denied that
there was any fight and testified that he had brought along his shot gun
for the purpose of going hunting the next day; that having decided
to leave, he reached under the bed for the gun, where he had put it
previously, and as he pulled it out, it accidentally discharged. The
Commonwealth failed to produce a single witness who actually saw
the shot fired. The trial court gave an instruction on voluntary man-
slaughter for grossly careless or reckless use of a firearm. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, saying that there was evidence to indicate that the
defendant was reckless in handling the gun, and in the course of the
opinion further added:
This case . . . seems to fall within the rule that when the accused
admits the killing the burden is upon him to show to the satisfaction
of the jury that he is blameless. 2
1262 S. W. 2d 809 (Ky. 1953).
'Id. at 811.
